МІЖРЕГІОНАЛЬНА АКАДЕМІЯ УПРАВЛІННЯ ПЕРСОНАЛОМ

МЕТОДИЧНІ РЕКОМЕНДАЦІЇ
щодо забезпечення самостійної роботи студентів
з дисципліни «Іноземна мова спеціальності».
(для бакалаврів)

Київ 2016
Підготовлено завідувачем кафедри іноземних мов Баховим І.С. 

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Методичні рекомендації містять пояснівальну записку, перелік тем для самостійного вивчення, шкалу самооцінювання професійних мовленнєвих умінь, контрольний перелік професійних мовленнєвих умінь для самооцінювання, завдання для самостійної роботи студентів, а також список літератури.
ПОЯСНЮВАЛЬНА ЗАПИСКА

Запропонований навчально-методичний матеріал для студентів факультету міжнародних відносин охоплює спеціальний текстовий матеріал та розроблені завдання для удосконалення лексичних навичок та розвитку усного та письменного мовлення з дисципліни «Іноземна мова спеціальності (англійська)».

Самостійна робота студентів є складовою навчального процесу, важливим чинником, який формує вміння навчатися, сприяє активізації засвоєння студентом знань. Самостійна робота студентів є основним засобом опанування навчального матеріалу у позааудиторний час.

Мета самостійної роботи студентів – сприяти засвоєнню в повному обсязі навчальної програми та формуванню самостійності як особистісної риси та важливої професійної якості, сутність якої полягає в умінні систематизувати, планувати та контролювати власну діяльність.

Основні завдання:
- навчити майбутнього фахівця вільно орієнтуватися в сучасному інформаційному потоці з метою удосконалення іншомовних умінь і навичок;
- удосконалювати комунікативні уміння й навички володіння англійською мовою при спілкуванні на професійні теми;
- розвивати уміння адекватно поводитися в різних життєвих ситуаціях ділового спілкування;
- готувати майбутнього фахівця до наукової діяльності, продовження освіти.

Наприкінці курсу студенти повинні вміти:
- вести бесіду-діалог проблемного характеру відповідно до програмної тематики та комунікативної функції;
- робити самостійні усні монолігічні повідомлення англійською мовою за тематикою курсу;
- реферувати (усно та письмово) оригінальні різностильові тексти;
- здійснювати адекватний переклад з англійської мови на українську та навпаки текстів, що відповідають тематиці та рівню складності курсу.

Значна частина методичних рекомендацій присвячена практичному застосуванню та розвитку лексичної та комунікативної компетенції студентів-міжнародників. Відтак, передбачена значна кількість тренувальних завдань та вправ для удосконалення навичок усного та письмового перекладу з англійської мови на українську та навпаки.
Read and translate the text

**Power Concepts in International Relations**

International relations are often viewed in terms of levels of analysis. The systemic level concepts are those broad concepts that define and shape an international environment. The concept of ‘power’ in international relations can be described as the degree of resources, capabilities, and influence in international affairs. It is often divided up into the concepts of ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’, hard power relating primarily to coercive power, such as the use of force, and soft power commonly covering economics, diplomacy and cultural influence. However, there is no clear dividing.

**Polarity** in international relations refers to the arrangement of power within the international system. The concept arose from bipolarity during the Cold War, with the international system dominated by the conflict between two superpowers, and has been applied retrospectively. Consequently, the international system prior to 1945 can be described as multi-polar, with power being shared among great powers. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to what some would call unipolarity, with the United States as a sole superpower.

Several theories of international relations draw upon the idea of ‘polarity’. The balance of power was a concept prevalent in Europe prior to the First World War, the thought being that by balancing power blocs it would create stability and prevent war. Theories of ‘the balance of power’ gained prominence again during the Cold War, being a central mechanism of Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism. Hegemonic stability theory (developed by Robert Gilpin) also draws upon the idea of polarity, specifically the state of unipolarity. Hegemony is the preponderance of power at one pole in the international system, and the theory argues this is a stable configuration because of mutual gains by both the dominant power and others in the international system. This is contrary to many neorealist arguments, particularly made by Kenneth Waltz, stating that the end of the Cold War and the state of unipolarity is an unstable configuration that will inevitably change.

Many advocate that the current international system is characterized by growing interdependence, the mutual responsibility and dependency on others. The role of international institutions and widespread acceptance of a number of operating principles in the international system reinforces ideas that relations are characterized by interdependence.

Dependency theory is a theory most commonly associated with Marxism, stating
that a set of core states exploit a set of weaker periphery states for their prosperity. Various versions of the theory suggest that this is either an inevitability (standard dependency theory), or use of the theory to highlight the necessity for change.

States can be classified by whether they accept the international status quo, or are revisionist, i.e. want change. Revisionist states seek to fundamentally change the rules and practices of international relations, feeling disadvantaged by the status quo. They see the international system as a largely western creation which serves to reinforce current realities. Japan is an example of a state that has gone from being a revisionist state to one that is satisfied with the status quo, because the status quo is now beneficial to it.

Speak on the topic What are positive and negative consequences of the regime’s collapse for Ukraine’s foreign policy?

Варіант 2.

Translate the following sentences into Ukrainian. Pay attention to the topical vocabulary given in bold type:

1. Publics around the world believe the balance of power between the U.S. and China is tipping in favor of China. Many global publics also think China will eventually eclipse the U.S. as the world’s leading superpower. 2. The media was under the hegemony of conformists supporting the status quo. 3. Emissions per head is not the sole criterion determining global warming. 4. But there are also more coercive measures reportedly under consideration. 5. Using the coercive power of the state will not help the medically needy find efficient and effective care. 6. Democracy was restored and coercive population policies were abandoned. 7. The preponderance of the dollar in global capital markets remains overwhelming. 8. If you don't like it, advocate for its revision, not its repeal. 9. What I've been trying to advocate is that it's an extremely authentic form of storytelling. 10. The rich and famous can hire the best lawyers, employ their own investigators and exploit the media to their advantage. 11. The power of the universe is waiting for you to exploit it. 12. The world however remain unipolar and there are no alternatives. 13. The principles retrospectively volunteered are wrong anyway. 14. The multi-polar world has become a global reality, recognized as a near certainty by no less an authority than the U.S. intelligence community. 15. Their graduates do pretty well, many rising to some sort of prominence. 16. The site has gained this prominence largely without paid staff or revenue. 17. It needs some monitoring so that we at least have some source of data that shows us how prevalent various kinds of fraud are. 18. Obesity is prevalent among younger people, too, and in fact is dramatically on the rise. 19. Generally the Europeans are content with the status quo. The last thing they
need at a time when Europe is so embroiled in its own internal debates, is the external distraction of a change in guard across the pond. 20. Hard power and soft power must be mutually reinforcing in ways that the actor’s purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently.

Speak on the topic What were the decisive reasons for a popular revolt in November 2013?

Вариант 3.

Read and translate the following text

End of the American superpower?

By The Washington Times, 2012

It took more than 60 years, but the days of America as a superpower are coming to an end. This is the finding of the Obama administration’s latest report, “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds,” which the National Intelligence Council (NIC) released Monday. Analyzing geopolitical trends over the next 15 to 20 years, the document concludes China will have eclipsed the United States as the world’s premier economic and military giant by 2030. The administration is convinced the United States and the West are in permanent decline.

It doesn’t have to be so. The NIC analysts predict a “return to pre-2008 growth rates” is highly unlikely for America and the European Union — at least for another decade, as the West’s anemic economies are being dragged down by massive budget deficits and crushing debt. These are problems that could be resolved but for the resistance to spending restraint in Washington and Brussels.

Wealth and power have been flowing from the West to the East for the past several decades, and China has been the big winner. Its rise has come at the expense of America. Beijing has amassed huge trade surpluses by manipulating its currency and violating basic labor and environmental standards. China’s market remains relatively closed to U.S. goods, while our market is flooded with cheap Chinese products. Hence, Beijing’s manufacturing output has soared. Its economy is the second-largest in the world – and growing.

Right now, the U.S. economy is double the size of China’s, but thanks to President Obama’s economic policies, we’re hardly growing. The Chinese leadership has largely avoided many of the mistakes committed by successive U.S. administrations. Beijing is to America what we once were to Great Britain: the emerging global powerhouse.

There is, however, a critical difference. America’s ascent represented a great advance for democracy and human freedom. China’s rise is a different matter. It poses a serious challenge to both the West and regional neighbors. Beijing’s state
capitalism is being driven by bellicose nationalism. China is engaged in a massive military buildup. It makes territorial claims on Taiwan as well as islands disputed by Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. China’s goal is clear: Drive America out of the Pacific on the road to becoming an authoritarian colossus. A world dominated by Beijing will be very different — and much nastier — than the one led by the United States since 1945.

The NIC report quotes economist John Maynard Keynes on nations’ willful blindness to the future. In 1937, Keynes said that “the idea of the future being different from the present is so repugnant to our conventional modes of thought and behavior that we, most of us, offer a great resistance to acting on it in practice.” The irony is that Keynesianism — with its stress on big government, a vast public sector and huge deficit spending — is primarily responsible for the economic morass and debt crisis plaguing the West. Decline is not a fate — it is a choice. Sadly, it is one that America, especially the Obama administration, has made. Until we change course, the future belongs to China.

Speak on the topic What steps should our country take to gain eventual EU membership?

Вариант 4.

Read and translate the text. Make a list of unknown words.

A Changing World Order?

By most measures, reports of America’s declining power, relative to the rest of the world, have again proved premature. The U.S. economy increasingly seems to be on an upswing. The United States remains among the world’s safest and most attractive investments. The shale gas revolution is transforming America into an energy giant of the future. The dollar, once slated for oblivion, seems destined to remain the world’s reserve currency for some time to come. American military power, even amid current budget cuts, remains unmatched in quantity and quality.

Meanwhile, the “rise of the rest,” which Fareed Zakaria and other declinists touted a few years ago, has failed to materialize as expected. For all of America’s problems at home — the fiscal crisis, political gridlock, intense partisanship and weak presidential leadership — other great powers, from China to India to Russia to the European Union, have debilitating problems of their own that, in some cases, promise to grow more severe.

Overall, the much-heralded return of a multipolar world of roughly equal great powers, akin to that which existed before World War II, has been delayed for at least a few more decades. Absent some unexpected dramatic change, the international system will continue to be that of one superpower and several great powers, or as the
late Samuel P. Huntington called it, “uni - multipolarity.”

If, however, by the normal measures of relative power things have not changed as much as some predicted, the international order certainly has entered a period of uncertainty and flux. In the United States in recent years, a great many Americans are questioning the nature and extent of their nation’s involvement in the world. It is not just the Great Recession or even unhappiness with the U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan that are driving disenchantment with what Americans used to like to call their global leadership. The old rationale for that deep global involvement, which took hold in the wake of World War II and persisted through the Cold War, is increasingly forgotten or actively rejected by Americans who wonder why the United States needs to play such an outsized role on the world stage.

President Obama’s foreign policies have both reflected and encouraged this desire for contraction and retrenchment. In fairness, explaining to Americans why the United States should continue to play the role of “indispensable” power is more complicated than it was during World War II, the Cold War or immediately after 9/11. With Nazis and Soviets around to keep things simple, very few American presidents ever needed, or bothered, to make the larger and more fundamental case that must be made now — that

America’s task since 1945 has been to foster and defend a liberal world order and stave off international anarchy, not just to pounce on the latest threat and go home. The president himself may not understand this.

At the same time, others around the world are wrestling with their own questions. How should international affairs be governed and regulated? What should be the roles of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations? How should the great powers relate to one another, and what special role, if any, should the United States play? These questions have no easy answers. Around the world there is great ambivalence about the United States. Some wish to see its influence fade; others want to see the United States more engaged; still others seemingly express both desires simultaneously. But whatever one thinks about the world order shaped by and around the American superpower, it is arguably less clear than ever what kind of system might replace it.

And if not the United States, then who? For many, the United Nations does not hold the promise it once did. Saudi Arabia’s recent refusal to accept a seat on the U.N. Security Council is only one sign of the disappointment in that body, which many see as hopelessly gridlocked and unreflective of today’s world, at least in terms of its veto-wielding members. Institutions such as the European Union, which even a decade ago seemed to offer a path to a new and different kind of world order, are struggling to maintain themselves, while newer efforts to build similar institutions in Asia founder on great-power competitions and jealousies. Any hope of a great-power
consortium, a global 21st-century version of the Concert of Europe, seems distant — even if such a thing were desirable.

Like the heralding of “American decline,” warnings about “the coming global disorder” have often proved premature. But with Americans and others rethinking the U.S. role in the world, and with no other nation, group of nations or international institutions willing or able to take its place, global disorder seems a more distinct possibility than it has since the 1930s. Perhaps the challenge is to fashion an international order that can reflect the continuing reality of “uni-multipolarity” but that somehow accommodates both global wariness of U.S. power and Americans’ wariness of their global role. History does not offer much reason for optimism. The world order rarely changes by means of smooth transitions. Usually, such change is a result of catalytic upheaval. *(by Robert Kagan)*

*Speak on the topic Is Ukraine welcomed as a EU member state?*

*Read and translate the text*

**FOREIGN POLICY OF CHINA**

China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. The fundamental goals of this policy are to preserve China’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, create a favorable international environment for China’s reform and opening up and modernization construction, maintain world peace and propel common development.

China has all along adhered to the principle of independence.

With regard to all international affairs, China will, proceeding from the fundamental interests of the Chinese people and the people of the world, determine its stand and policy in the light of the merits and demerits of the matter, without yielding to any outside pressure.

China does not form an alliance with any big power or group of big powers. Nor does China establish military groups with other countries, or engage in arms race and military expansion. China opposes hegemonism and preserves world peace. China believes that all countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members of the international community. Countries should resolve their disputes and conflicts peacefully through consultations and not resort to the use or threat of force. Nor should they interfere in others’ internal affairs under any pretext.

China never imposes its social system and ideology on others, nor allows other countries to impose theirs on it. China actively facilitates the establishment of a new international political and economic order that is fair and rational. China holds that the new order should give expression to the demands of the development of history and progress of the times and reflect the universal aspirations and common interests
of the peoples of all countries in the world. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the universally recognized norms governing international relations should serve as the basis for setting up the new international political and economic order.

China is ready to establish and develop friendly relations of cooperation with all the countries on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. China pursues a policy of all dimensional opening up to the outside. It is ready to develop, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, extensive trade relations, economic and technological cooperation and scientific and cultural exchanges with countries and regions of the world so as to promote common prosperity. After 15 years’ talks, China finally acceded to the World Trade Organization on December 11, 2001. While enjoying the relevant rights, China has begun earnestly honoring its obligations within the framework of the WTO and its commitments. China remains ready to play a positive role, together with other countries, in improving world multilateral trade system and promoting prosperity and progress in the world.

As a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, China actively participates in the political solution of the problems of regional hot spots. China’s peace-keepers have joined United Nations peacekeeping operations. China supports the reform of the United Nations and a continued important role of the United Nations and other multilateral organs in international affairs. China is firmly opposed to all forms of terrorism and has made important contributions to international anti-terrorism cooperation. China devotes itself actively to pushing forward the cause of international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. To date, China has joined all the treaties related to international arms control and non-proliferation.

Speak on the topic What steps should our country take to gain eventual EU membership?

Варіант 6.

Read and translate the following text

End of the sole superpower’s unipolar world

by Zafar Bangash February, 2013

America’s role as the sole superpower is not only over but it is becoming the pauper power with thousands of factory closings, jobs shipped overseas, its debt reaching the sky and its military having been thoroughly defeated. America’s dream has become a nightmare for most people.
The global political scene is not only changing; it has changed quite dramatically in the last decade. The pompous notion of a unipolar world in which the self-proclaimed “sole superpower” maintained perpetual full-spectrum dominance à la Project for the New American Century (PNAC) is no longer tenable. Outside the dwindling circle of Washington’s armchair warriors, most American officials have realized that they can no longer afford any more wars of choice. Thomas Friedman, a tireless drumbeater for American exceptionalism, had conceded this point nearly two years ago in his article about the US being reduced to “The Frugal Superpower” (New York Times, September 4, 2010). Friedman’s reluctance to admit that the US is no longer a superpower at all reflects the lingering residue of imperial hubris.

“American pacifists need not worry any more about ‘wars of choice,’” wrote Friedman in the Times. Continuing about wars of choice, Friedman wrote: “We’re not doing that again. We can’t afford to invade Grenada today,” referring to the US invasion of the tiny Caribbean island in October 1983 when thousands of marines landed to “save” all 110,000 Grenadians sunbathing on the beaches from “a communist takeover,” in the infamous words of then US President Ronald Reagan. The US will not be soon invading any other country either. This is not to suggest it has given up on mischief.

In his seminal work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987), historian Paul Kennedy talks about imperial overreach and presents a strong correlation between economic strength based on productivity, and military power. It may appear obvious in the context of big powers but economic well-being does not automatically translate into military power. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar stand out as ready examples. Despite their enormous wealth, these countries are incapable of defending themselves from even relatively minor neighbours. Kennedy quotes former US President Richard Nixon who in July 1971 identified five centers of power: Western Europe (today’s European Union), Japan, China, the Soviet Union and the US. Nixon said: “These are the five that will determine the economic future and because economic power will be the key to other kinds of power, the future of the world in other ways in the last third of this century (italics in the original).”

Economic strength is of course an important factor in turning a country into a military power and then projecting it. Paupers hardly threaten the world unless it is to get some food but their concerns do not go much further. It is the rich, motivated by greed that want to become richer at the expense of others. Among great powers, rivalry has always been predicated on who can muster more guns, more warships and more planes to intimidate competitors.

Britain’s role as a great power ended in the mid 20th century; its place was taken up by two new powers: the Soviet Union and the US. Their rivalry was dubbed the “Cold War” because they did not engage in shooting wars against each other; that
was reserved for their puppets euphemistically called allies. By the late 1980s, the Soviets had been bankrupted by two related developments: an expensive arms race with the US and their ill-conceived invasion of Afghanistan. Ten years after invading Afghanistan, the Soviets were forced to retreat in disgrace but there was no Soviet Union left to return to.

Since then, the world has undergone numerous changes. Not learning from the Soviet experience, the Americans assumed their superior weapons supplied to the Afghans had enabled them to defeat the Red Army. Imperial hubris rather than thoughtful reflection consumed American thinking. They repeated the same mistake their erstwhile rival, the USSR, had made. As the late Charles De Gaulle once remarked, Americans are capable of doing the most stupid things imaginable, and even those that are completely unimaginable. For a decade (1991-2001), the US appeared unmatched. It could arguably be called the American decade. Then it blundered into Afghanistan and soon thereafter into Iraq in fulfillment of the neocons’ death wish for multiple wars waged simultaneously, and for “full-spectrum dominance.” More than a decade later, the US is still stuck in the Hindu Kush mountains, its arrogance proving the biggest obstacle to admitting its blunder and cutting its losses by leaving.

To return to Nixon’s pronouncement, Western Europe has made major strides economically while skillfully passing its military costs to the US. In recent years, Europe’s economic well-being has also received major blows like the rest of the capitalist West. Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain, appropriately abbreviated to PIGS, are facing economic meltdown and some European states, primarily Germany that ranks first among equals, has had to foot the bill for their bailout, despite the fact that it was German and British banks that did more to devalue the Euro than any mismanagement by the PIGS. The Euro, the European Union’s single currency, is also facing difficulty although it is the US dollar that is being shunned internationally. It is seen as toxic since America is no longer a productive power.

Speak on the topic What are Ukraine’s new government’s main foreign policy priorities?

Варіант 7.

Read and translate the following text

End of the sole superpower’s unipolar world (part 2)

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, its military alliance with client states, also disintegrated. Thus there are no more Russian or East European tanks poised to roll into Western Europe thereby making NATO, the western world’s equivalent military alliance, ostensibly irrelevant. Led by the US, NATO member-
states are trying to invent a new role for it hence the desperate attempt to make it relevant by sending NATO troops into Afghanistan and Iraq and threatening neighboring countries as well. China meanwhile has outpaced Japan and has become an underwriter of the US economy.

The cumulative effect of several factors is what led to the 2008 Recession in the US. Some economists, including American, insist the US suffered a depression. For decades American corporations outsourced work to countries where wages were low — Mexico, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and even China. In the American retail giant Wal Mart, one can hardly find a US manufactured product. The outsourcing tsunami destroyed America’s manufacturing base. Plant closures followed with millions losing jobs. The US may have weathered these dislocations but for the two disastrous wars into which the neocons pushed the country. The total direct cost of these wars has topped $2 trillion and with related costs — payments to permanently crippled soldiers and death benefits — these easily surpass the $4 trillion mark, according to two leading US economists: Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmas. Today, the US external debt stands at more than $16 trillion. Add to that the internal debt of $38 trillion and Washington is well on its way to becoming a bankrupt state.

America’s annual earnings can only cover the cost of medicare, defence and interest on its burgeoning debt that adds nearly $450 billion annually. With unemployment at 9% (in some critical age groups, such as among the African American population between the age of 15-24, it is as high as 30%), the housing bubble collapse, the list of homeless increasing daily and 46 million people living below the poverty line, America is fast joining the rank of third- world countries. In fact, some parts of the US already look like the Third World. One need not go to South Africa to find fast moving highways and exclusive gated communities surrounded by rundown African townships; they exist right in the heart of America in almost all major cities. Detroit may be the most extreme case but third-world conditions are just as widespread only a few miles outside the White House and Capitol Hill in Washington, DC.

In the past, America bombed its way out of recessions. This was true of the Second World War, the Vietnam War and in more recent times, the Iraq War of 1991. Yet war is no longer a profitable business for the US. On November 8, 2002, Richard Perle, a leading neocon and chairman of the US Defence Policy Group, had presented a rosy picture of the soon to be launched war against Iraq (March 2003). Perle predicted that the war would not cost more than $60 billion and in any case, most of the costs would be offset by Iraq’s oil revenues that Perle admitted the US would grab. Ten years and millions of Iraqi deaths later, the US has failed to achieve any of its objectives as it teeters on bankruptcy.

So what went wrong? Professor Stephen Walt, a thoughtful American academic
and someone not part of the neocon cabal, had this to say: “A big part of the problem, however, is that the United States has chosen to do a few things that are very difficult, and where failure is to be expected. Like nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan. Trying to occupy and govern foreign societies that are rife with internal divisions, where there is a well-founded hatred of foreign intruders, wouldn’t be easy for anyone. Indeed, trying to create a political system there based on our historical experience rather than theirs has got to be one of more ambitious — if not utterly misguided — objectives that Washington could have picked”.

But even Walt is loathed to admit total defeat. He insists the US still has a role to play in global affairs and in shaping the political landscape. “The solution is not to retreat into isolationism and cede the initiative to others. Rather, the solution is to remind ourselves what American power is good for, and avoid taking on tasks for which it is ill-suited. The United States is very good at deterring large-scale aggression, and thus good at ensuring stability in key regions. (That assumes, of course, that we aren’t using that same power to destabilize certain regions on purpose). We are sometimes good at brokering peace deals — as in Northern Ireland and the Balkans — when we use our power judiciously and fairly.” Such power, however, will never be used in Palestine, because the Zionists will brook no interference from the US or anyone else. In any case, a US-imposed peace in Palestine would actually be detrimental to the interests of the Palestinians. Peace will be achieved only when there is justice for the Palestinians. For that to happen, a much harder struggle will have to be waged. Given America’s weakened position, the struggle has better chances of success from now on, as the Zionist State begins to implode from inner contradictions.

The US-led unipolar world is dead. While multiple competing centers of power have emerged, whether any will replace the US has yet to be seen. An important factor in this emerging world order will be the role played by such key Muslim players as Islamic Iran, Egypt, Pakistan and movements like Hizbullah and Hamas. Until recently, Turkey was considered to be a positive factor as well but its policies especially vis-à-vis Syria and Palestine leave much to be desired. Instead of playing its natural role, Ankara has decided to play second fiddle to the vanishing superpower and its nasty ally, Zionist Israel.

Speak on the topic Why did Ukraine’s foreign policy appear incoherent and unclear in the last two decades?

Варіант 8.

Read and translate the following text

The End of Human Rights
When an icon of the 20th century’s strivings against oppression passes away, it is an appropriate time to take freedom’s audit.

“The struggles that follow the victory of formal equality and universal franchise may not be as filled with drama and moral clarity as those that came before,” President Obama said in his eulogy of Nelson Mandela last month, “but they are no less important.” And United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon urged the world to be “inspired” by Mandela’s spirit. “His death has awakened in all of us,” he said, “the flame of human rights and the beacon of hope.” Their message was clear: We have come far, but there is a great deal left to do.

Yet despite this rhetoric of rededication and hope, the ground of human rights is crumbling beneath us. If we seem to have moved beyond “drama and moral clarity,” it is only because we no longer know where we are going. In fact, a 150-year experiment in creating global rules to protect and defend individual human beings is coming to an end.

The evidence is all around us. Authoritarian pushback against human rights in China raises the prospect of a new superpower utterly opposed to the hitherto dominant language of universal rights. And Russia, if anything, outdoes China, with Vladimir Putin manipulating his citizens’ legitimate aspirations for even basic freedoms. From the introduction of sharia law in Brunei to the consolidation of a murderous military regime in Egypt (where the alternative was the ultra-conservative Muslim Brotherhood), we see examples everywhere of resistance to human rights, in practice and in principle.

In a stupefying act of bravado, Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s most systematic abusers of human rights, rejected its seat on the Security Council, saying the United Nations fails to prevent “the violation of rights” around the world. African leaders resist the authority of the International Criminal Court, Bashar al-Assad strengthens his grip on power in Syria after his regime uses chemical weapons to murder thousands. We see extreme conservatism on gay rights throughout Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and now on India’s Supreme Court. And when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) declares, seemingly in earnest, that the exercise of human rights may be limited by “the just requirements of national security, public order, public health, public safety, public morality, as well as the general welfare of the peoples in a democratic society,” that is a mandate for executive power and social conservatism, not for inalienable rights.

A Freedom House called on the United States and Europe to do more. But the United States is worse than an ambivalent onlooker. Its use of torture and rendition against al-Qaeda suspects, its detentions without trial at Guantanamo, its drone program and targeted assassinations, and its rejection of the International Criminal Court all undermine the very idea, let alone the practice, of human rights.
Even the early promise of the Obama administration has dimmed. Political and security realities have reduced the scope of American unilateralism, the president admitted in his address to the U.N. General Assembly in September. The future, he said, will be about international and regional partners for peace and prosperity. In an era when containing China is paramount, we know what “partners” means: deals. No ASEAN state should expect a call from the president about human rights anytime soon.

Of course, governments have always been reluctant to tie their hands with human rights considerations, and cultural and religious diversity guarantees that the secular global rights regime will always have detractors and foes. But this is more than a transient change. We have taken the two-steps-forward, one-step-back nature of human rights for granted, assuming that the arc of history does indeed bend toward justice. The assumption underlying Obama’s Mandela eulogy is that matters of compliance, not principle, are the main challenge remaining. But the great moral drama of liberal freedoms vs. state and religious repression and discrimination is alive and insistent today, even as we are in a forced retreat from the battlefield.

This isn’t just a change from the 1990s, the 1970s or even the 1950s. It is the end of a historic project that began in Europe in 1863 with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the first permanent, secular, international organization dedicated to the protection of the suffering individual. The export of a liberal-humanist vision of global civilization, first through empire and then via the 20th century’s international institutions, has reached an impasse. Europe’s slow political decline has been disguised for decades by American power. Now the two are diverging, the Asia-Pacific calling Americans to turn East. The world in which global rules were assumed to be secular, universal and nonnegotiable rested on the presumption of a deep worldwide consensus about human rights — but this consensus is illusory.

**Speak on the topic** **Compare the state regimes in Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Belarus and Poland.**

Варіант 9.

**Read and translate the following text**

**The End of Human Rights (2)**

The first challenge is multipolarity. It’s been more than a century since we’ve lived in a truly multipolar world. Now, as power shifts rapidly to Asia, the influence of Europe, so often the driving force for human rights and international justice, has waned. The United States has proved a fair-weather friend for human rights abroad and is now far more interested in China and its own export markets in Asia and the
Pacific. The new and re-emerging powers known as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) are not uniformly against human rights — although the records of Russia and China are abysmal — but they will increasingly want a say on global rules and who gets to set them. Newly emerging states are challenging settled opinion on transnational justice and humanitarian intervention, which they often interpret as victor’s justice and regime change. And the global rules and principles that organizations such as the United Nations rely on were not written by the vast majority of the world’s peoples, who have long seen powerful states declare exceptions for themselves and their allies. Newly powerful states will challenge this system — and seek exceptions of their own.

A multipolar world means more compromise — as we already see in Syria — more back-scratching and less principled denunciation. America’s notorious skepticism about most human rights treaties has in the past been tempered because international rights seemed to go hand in hand with Washington’s goal of spreading democracy. But opponents can now see U.S. ambivalence about strengthening global liberal institutions — outside the trade and finance realm — and know there will be little pushback when the stakes are high.

Human rights made sense for a secularizing Europe that sought a moral alternative to religious faith. But the world has not followed the secular path. If anything, it is becoming more intense in its religiosity — that is the second challenge. Over the past century, for example, Christianity has seen a massive shift toward the south, with more than 60 percent of Christians now living in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In Africa alone, the number of Christians rose from 9 million to 516 million between 1910 and 2010. And we are as aware of the intensity of Islamic faith held by millions in many of the countries of the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia as we are of the passionate evangelism shared by millions of Christians in the Americas and Africa particularly.

The language of human rights is a language of protest and resistance, not of authority and discrimination. In a religious world, secular human rights of recent heritage and ambiguous origin increasingly compete with long-standing cultural claims legitimated by traditions and gods. Where strong faith meets human rights, the classic modernizing assumption — that secular rights trump religion — no longer holds.

A more multipolar world, America’s ambivalence, Europe’s decline and more competition from faith-based movements — all these forces put extreme pressure on a human rights model that is heavily Westernized and centralized in funding and organization. And so a paradox emerges. Achieving progress in civil and political rights, for example, might mean ceding ground in other areas such as social justice and women’s rights. All rights are equally important to the global human rights
regime with which we are familiar. But for many of those who are poor, or committed to socialist politics, or deeply religious and/or conservative, both inside and outside the West, which rights deserve primacy requires discussion and compromise, not diktats from New York and Geneva.

The classic Human Rights Watch strategy of “naming and shaming” rights abusers is irrelevant in cases where, for example, the imposition of sharia law is considered desirable by those who must be shamed for change to happen. In the multipolar world, justice for acts of egregious violence may mean the death penalty — or it may mean outright forgiveness. This world may be one where women seeking an end to domestic violence and desirous of education for their daughters nevertheless oppose reproductive rights on principle. Or where the idea that children have rights they can claim against their parents, rather than obligations, seems to strike at the heart of the most valued social institution of all, the family.

In this world, religious groups of all kinds have an opportunity to play a greater role in struggles for freedom from hunger and repression than they have done in the decades when secular experts in development and human rights held sway. Pope Francis, Time magazine’s “Person of the Year,” has insisted that the church is not a nongovernmental organization — meaning it has more to offer than secular activism and advocacy. The church has a deeper, more powerful, more attractive and more important spiritual message to spread, he has said, surely recognizing that the weak grip of conventional Western human rights principles in individual communities is no match for the moral power of the church. The new pope’s seemingly more liberal stances on social issues and his critique of capitalism may make him a better bet for radical change — he can in principle mobilize a billion people — than the rather arid, dry and legalistic claims of secular human rights advocates.

We are waking from the European dream of one world under global, secular law. The result may be a reinvigorated universal church. Or it may be parallel and permanent zones of freedom and zones of repression, and a global middle class seeking desperately to move themselves, or at least their children, from one to another.

Speak on the topic What impact have the recent events in Ukraine had on the world order in general and power zones division in particular?

Вариант 10.

Read and translate the text: Ukraine’s Foreign Policy: Current Issues

Since achieving independence in 1991, conflict between Ukraine’s political forces has led its foreign policy to appear incoherent, as thecontending forces
pulled it in pro-Western or pro-Russia directions or simply neglected foreign policy as less important than domestic political combat and the division of the spoils of victory. Ukrainian leaders gave lip service to joining NATO and the European Union, but did little to meet the standards set by these organizations. Ukrainian leaders also promised closer ties with Russia in exchange for Russian energy at subsidized prices, but balked at implementing agreements with Russia that would seriously compromise Ukraine’s sovereignty, such as ceding control over Ukraine’s energy infrastructure to Moscow. Yanukovych’s foreign policy appeared to fit into this pattern, although he broke with previous Ukrainian presidents by formally rejecting NATO membership for Ukraine. Yanukovych’s last minute decision in November 2013 to decline to sign an Association Agreement with the EU touched off a popular revolt that led to the collapse of his regime.

Ukraine’s new government’s main foreign policy priorities are to secure international support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Kyiv is seeking urgent international assistance to ameliorate the country’s dire financial situation. The government also strongly supports European Union integration for Ukraine, but says that NATO membership aspirations are not a current priority. In addition to the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine may face further pressure from a hostile Russian leadership, which does not recognize the legitimacy of the new government. This could include direct military intervention in eastern Ukraine. Russia has implemented some de facto trade sanctions against Ukraine, and used natural gas prices and debts as a weapon against Ukraine. Russia could also harass or expel Ukrainian citizens working in Russia.

Ukraine and its Significance in Maintaining Stability and Security on the European Continent

Ukraine takes into account its European priority in constructing its security policy. Ukraine is a participant in the process of erecting a new architecture for the European security and actively supports the position that the emergence of new division of Europe, be it iron or paper, cannot be permitted.

Ukraine is taking active part in peacemaking efforts, especially in settling stalemated conflicts. Being involved in regulating peace in the Balkans (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo), functioning as an intermediary in settling the situation in Transnistria (Moldova), or playing a positive role in settling the conflict in Abkhazia (Georgia), Ukraine is demonstrating that it can be a real contributor to security in Europe. In this context, our nation's collaboration with UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO, and within GUUAM (Georgia-Ukraine-Uzbekistan-Azerbaijan-Moldova) is of great importance.
Speaks on the topic: What is the administrative status of the Crimean Autonomous Republic currently? How is it recognized on the international arena?

Вариант 11.

Read and translate the text:

European Union

Ukraine seeks eventual EU membership, but most EU countries have opposed raising this issue, in part due to the huge burden a large, poor country like Ukraine could place on already-strained EU coffers. The Association Agreement is the EU’s main instrument to promote European values and deepen economic ties with Ukraine and other former Soviet countries. The agreement includes a free trade agreement with the EU, formally known in EU jargon as a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). Although the DCFTA further opens potentially lucrative EU markets to Ukraine, it also requires it to adopt EU legislation and standards and to expose its own firms to tough competition from EU imports. Approximation to EU norms could also lead to increased foreign investment in Ukraine. Under intense pressure from Russia, which strongly opposed Ukraine’s intention to sign the AA, the Ukrainian government announced on November 21 that it would not sign the agreement, the start in a series of events that led to the regime’s demise three months later. EU officials and officials of EU member governments condemned violence by the former Ukrainian government and their allies against peaceful protestors. They called on the Ukrainian government to quickly adopt the steps needed to end the political crisis in Ukraine peacefully. After a sharp escalation of the violence on February 18 and 19, the EU decided to impose a visa ban and asset freezes on Ukrainian officials responsible for violence. On February 21, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and Poland came to Kyiv and brokered a peaceful settlement of the crisis, which was almost immediately rendered obsolete by the collapse of the regime.

The collapse of the Yanukovych regime appears to have brightened prospects for a closer relationship with the EU. The EU and Ukraine signed the parts of Ukraine’s Association Agreement dealing with political issues on March 21, 2014. The parts of the AA dealing with economic issues would be signed later this year, after the new Ukrainian President takes office. However, the EU has said that it will allow Ukraine to benefit unilaterally from the DCFTA before the signature of the economic parts of the AA. On March 5, the European Commission unveiled an 11.175 billion Euro (about $15.5 billion) aid package for Ukraine. In addition, the EU will establish a High Level Investment Forum/Task Force; help modernize Ukraine’s
natural gas transit system and work on reversing the flow of pipelines through Slovakia so that Ukraine can receive gas from the west; acceleration of Visa Liberalisation Action Plan; and technical assistance on a number of areas from constitutional to judicial reform and preparation of elections.2 On March 17, the day after Crimean authorities held a referendum on joining Russia, the European Union imposed a visa ban and an asset freeze on 21 figures from Ukraine and Russia who played roles in Russia’s seizure of Crimea. Analysts noted that senior Russian leaders were lacking from the list, which nevertheless included several members of the Russian parliament and Russian military commanders in Crimea. On March 21, the EU imposed sanctions on 12 additional Russian leading figures, after President Putin signed an agreement with Crimean leaders incorporating the region into Russia.3 However, the EU still stopped short of sanctioning leading business figures who support the Russian regime or key Russian banks and other firms.

Speak on the topic What are the basic scenarios of conflict settlement in the eastern regions of Ukraine? Give your reasons (pros and cons) for “peaceful” and “military” solution.

Варіант 12.

Read and translate the text:

Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Congressional Research Service

Translate the following sentences into Ukrainian. Pay attention to the topical vocabulary given in bold type:

1. Spence, however, says the evidence suggests to him the fires were set during an internal revolt. 2. Only change will come with revolt and revolution in such a tyrant situation. 3. In fact, many have argued that colonizers are unethical and the colonized should always revolt. 4. Or they could simply refuse to cede control for cash at all, rejecting the program entirely. 5. He has said that he is not prepared to cede any sovereignty to the centre. 6. He inherited incoherent spending priorities, a broken procurement process and two disastrously mismanaged wars. 7. The food industry is only paying lip service to government campaigns to make people eat a healthy diet. 8. This politician can be said to be “paying lip service” to the ideas of capitalism and democracy to please the people that will vote for him. 9. Forget a password, and your own computer may balk at your command. 10. Senate abandons auto bailout bid after Republicans balk. 11. Poor nations balk at trade proposals. 12. On 19 March 2011, a multi-state coalition began a military intervention in Libya to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. 13. His death decisively ends a regime that had turned Libya into an international pariah and ran the oil-rich nation by the whim and brutality of its leaders. 14. The Syrian regime
has killed more than 1,500 civilians, human rights groups say, and about 12,000 people have been arrested. 15. Nonetheless, it appears the regime’s opponents have not managed to create a unified leadership. 16. Annexation is the means by which an existing city extends its corporate boundaries. 17. We can’t just annex territories. 18. International law decrees that no nation can annex the moon for itself. 19. By expanding our nonpolluting energy choices, we can ameliorate a variety of risks. 20. Education and graded self management experience would appear to be important to ameliorate this situation in the long term. 21. German visa entry requirements vary depending on an applicant’s country of citizenship. 22. Coming on a work visa, staying for a year or two, applying for permanent residency. 23. My student identification card, along with my student visa, had expired a long time ago. 24. But they were facing a master strategist who understood the power of escalation. 25. The market must fear this will cause a sharp escalation in the currency wars. 26. The clashes are an escalation of skirmishes that began earlier this year. 27. The logic of confrontation implied an escalation of violence. 28. European Union foreign-policy chief Catherine Ashton talks about the EU decision to expand the list of those subject to asset freezes and visa bans. 29. It’s also unfortunate that the ranking does not incorporate student extracurricular opportunities for development. 30. Collection agencies harass workers at their places of employment, threatening their jobs.

Speak on the topic What are the main objectives of OSCE mission in Ukraine?

Variant 13.

Read and translate the text:

Ukraine’s Foreign Policy

The principal provisions on the Ukrainian foreign policy are legalized by both the Constitution of Ukraine and Laws in force. The Verkhovna Rada has adopted a resolution, The Basic Directions of Ukraine's Foreign Policy, which is a basic documents outlining priorities for the Ukrainian state in its activities in the international arena, and the law of Ukraine, On Ukraine’s International Agreements.

Ukraine takes active part in all the processes taking place in both Europe and the world. Ukraine’s major task is to revive its European identity that means in the first place the priority of its integration into European structures, in particular, the European Union, in strengthening of European and Atlantic partnership, and active participation in regional initiatives and mechanisms of cooperation.

Ukraine’s full-scale participation in European integration processes make it necessary for it to gain membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is also bound up with gaining broader access to world markets and improving
people’s lives. Ukrainian commodity producers have much to offer to the world market.

Ukraine’s Europe-oriented foreign policy does not restrict development of bilateral collaboration. Of great importance is the cooperation with Ukraine's strategic partners: the USA, Russian Federation, Poland, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan. Ukraine will continue to develop equal and mutually beneficial bilateral relations with neighboring and other states, in particular, with those of the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and the Asian-Pacific region on the basis of partnership and openness.

*Speak on the topic* What International organizations is Ukraine member of? What sort of support and benefits does our state get from them?*

Варіант 14.

*Read and translate the text:*

**Ukraine’s Integration into European Structures**

The resolution, Basic Directions of Ukraine's Foreign Policy, clearly makes Ukraine's membership in the European communities a priority goal of its foreign policy.

Today, the basis for bilateral relations between Ukraine and the European Union is laid in the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation and the Joint EU Ukrainian Strategy, in which the EU recognizes Ukraine's Europe oriented aspirations and welcomes its European choice. The joint strategy provides a powerful impulse of political support for Ukraine, favors faster internal transformations within Ukraine and is an important tool which, alongside the partnership and other agreements, strengthens the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the EU.

In turn, Ukraine has adopted internal conceptual documents aimed at safeguarding its European choice. Among them is the Strategy of Ukraine's Integration into EU, which outlines the major priorities for activities of the Ukrainian executive branch bodies until the year 2007. The Program of Ukraine’s EU Integration is a practical guide formulating specific assignments for the Ukrainian ministries and departments so that the Strategy is implemented.

Economic cooperation is an important component in the relations between Ukraine and EU. Nowadays, Ukraine has signed a Cooperation Declaration with the countries, which are members of the European Free Trade Association, opening to Ukraine access to the European economic space.

**Ukraine and its Significance in Maintaining Stability and Security on the European Continent**

Ukraine takes into account its European priority in constructing its security
policy. Ukraine is a participant in the process of erecting a new architecture for the European security and actively supports the position that the emergence of new division of Europe, be it iron or paper, cannot be permitted.

Ukraine is taking active part in peacemaking efforts, especially in settling stalemated conflicts. Being involved in regulating peace in the Balkans (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo), functioning as an intermediary in settling the situation in Transnistria (Moldova), or playing a positive role in settling the conflict in Abkhazia (Georgia), Ukraine is demonstrating that it can be a real contributor to security in Europe. In this context, our nation's collaboration with UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO, and within GUUAM (Georgia-Ukraine-Uzbekistan-Azerbaijan-Moldova) is of great importance.

**Speak on the topic** What kind of relations with the neighbouring countries is Ukraine involved into? What should be done to improve the situation?

Варіант 15.

**Read and translate the text:**

Ukraine and the UN

Ukraine was among the UN’s founders and has contributed much to giving birth to this world international organization. As a UN member, Ukraine has been elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council three times (1948-1949, 1984-1985, 2000-2001) and a member of the UN Economic and Social Council four times (most recently in 1993 - 1995). Ukraine's representatives have been repeatedly elected to executive positions in the major committees of the General Assembly sessions, particularly, to chair the UN General Assembly at the 52nd session in 1997.

Today, Ukraine is active in reforming the UN. Our state stands for making the Security Council's methods more transparent and has advanced and supports an increased UN Security Council staff by introducing more permanent and non-permanent members while focusing on the adequate representation of the East European regional group within the UN.

Confirming its peace-loving policy by definite actions, Ukraine decided to send peacemaking contingents as part of the UN missions to Lebanon and Congo.

Ukraine and OSCE

Ukraine is taking an active part in discussing and settling all urgent issues of international security, and cooperation within the OSCE region, in particular, in developing an architecture of general European security and the strengthening stability, following a need to enhance the role and effectiveness of the OSCE in safeguarding security within the region in terms of political, military, human,
economic, ecological, and other spheres, and to enhance OSCE's preventive and peacemaking potential.

Today's cooperation of Ukraine with the OSCE is an example to be followed by other countries. It is this cooperation in supporting the rights of national minorities in terms of OSCE's efforts in Ukraine that became the organization’s first success in implementing its mission’s goals and completely carrying out its mandate.

**Ukraine and the Council of Europe**

Ukraine’s participation in the Council of Europe is evidence of its steadfast adherence to its European choice and to the commonly recognized principles of pluralistic democracy, the rule of law, and commitment to basic human rights and liberties. As an organic part of the European cultural originality, Ukraine promotes its development on its side. Ukraine is taking active part in helping the Council of Europe address social problems, in particular, in support of the rights of national minorities, combating xenophobia and racial intolerance, environmental protection, the maintenance of biological ethics, as well as controlling AIDS and drug abuse.

Ukraine is a participant of a series of conventions by the Council of Europe, in particular, the European Cultural Convention, European Framework Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation among territorial communities or authorities, European Convention on Information about Foreign Legislation, six crime control conventions, and Framework Convention on Protecting National Minorities.

_Speak on the topic What are the main prerogatives of the Ukrainian foreign policy at present?_

Bapia116.

_Read and translate the text:_

**Ukraine and NATO**

Collaboration with NATO, which has already been underway for six years, is based on Ukraine’s national interests and is determined by the role the alliance plays in maintaining international peace, stability, security, bettering the overall climate of confidence in the European-Atlantic region, and establishing a new regional security system in Europe. This cooperation was legalized by the Charter of Special Partnership signed in 1997 and the Individual Partnership Program within the Partnership for Peace Program.

Ukraine is closely involved in a great many actions taken in combination with NATO member and partner countries to address political, military, technical, scientific, economical, ecological, and civil emergency issues.

Today Ukraine actively cooperates with NATO within the 19+1 format to
Further develop mutual relations, improve mutual understanding and compatibility, implement joint efforts and collaboration for stronger peace and stability in Europe, increase trust, and assert European democratic and legal standards to the benefit of the new united European commonwealth.

**Ukraine’s Participation in Regional Cooperation**

An important component in Ukrainian foreign policy is arranging regional forms of cooperation. The purposeful putting forward of Ukrainian interests within the efforts of regional groupings makes possible step-by-step movement toward European integration and helps draw Ukraine into broad participation in the political and economical processes which take place in East Central and Southeast Europe.

Ukrainian diplomacy ensures sound and effective participation in regional instruments of cooperation, especially within the frameworks of the Central-European Initiative, Black Sea Organization for Economic Cooperation, and Council of Baltic Sea States. Participation in these associations should promote the development of multilateral interactions with the member states and positively influence the advance of Ukraine along the road of market reforms.

A promising form of regional cooperation stems from the consultative forum of five states -- Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUUAM) -- which was created as a result of the active development of the multilateral cooperation among these countries. The harmony of their positions in most issues of international cooperation and a strategy for further development makes possible a productive coordination of efforts intended to attain stated goals by combined action.

Ukraine actively participates in implementing the Pact on Stability in Southeast Europe, thus favoring the post-conflict rehabilitation of the countries, which suffered from the Kosovo crisis.

**Speak on the topic** *Give the definition of the foreign policy of Ukraine and its principal constituents.*

**Вариант 17.**

**Read and translate the text:**

**The Guardian view on subversion in Ukraine and its impact on the international system**

As the G20 meets in Australia, the collateral damage from the Ukraine crisis affects both trade and nuclear weapons securit

The poison injected into international life by Russia’s intervention in Ukraine spreads apace. When [Russia joined the G8 and the G20](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G8) in the late 90s, the idea was to integrate Moscow into the collaborative systems linking advanced states, an
integration expected to be as political as it was economic. Now these encounters are
more likely to be the scene of confrontation than of cooperation. This weekend’s G20
summit in Australia could well be dominated by Ukraine, with the less engaged
powers standing by bemusedly as the Europeans, the Americans and the Russians
trade accusations and counter-accusations.

They were already exchanging the opening shots before the meeting began. David
Cameron warned of increased sanctions in Brisbane on Friday, while President
Vladimir Putin, speaking in Moscow before leaving for the summit, said the United
States, by imposing sanctions on Russia, was “crudely violating” the principles of the
trade institutions it played a leading part in creating. Russia, he added, could weather
sanctions, which would hurt those who imposed them as much as they did Russia.

The way Mr Putin discusses these matters is as if Russia were quietly minding
its own business when it was suddenly subject to unprovoked acts of economic
warfare. He and his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, are masters of the art of feigned
innocence. They intersperse bouts of the most brazen lying with periods in which
they appear open to reason. They send in the troops, then pull them out. They endorse
agreements, then renege on them.

That is why the war in Ukraine has not gone away. Sustained by Russian troops
on the ground and by Russian lies in the media, it follows what is now a familiar and
deadly script. First there are incursions by Russian forces, going into Ukraine to
reinforce the rebels there and assist them in consolidating or extending the territories
they control. Then there is fighting. Sometimes the Ukrainians gain the upper hand,
in which case the Russians send in more troops to redress the balance. Then comes a
sort of diplomatic patching up, the latest version of which was the Minsk accord of
early September. The Ukrainians are so desperate for any respite and the Europeans
are so anxious to believe that there is, there could be, or at least that there should be, a
chance of a settlement that they go along with it.

Then the violations begin, and then they get worse, which, according to the
Ukrainians, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and now Nato,
is what has been happening in recent weeks as Russian columns move once more into
the country. The motive can be guessed at: the rebel zones don’t make much
economic or political sense, nor does a Crimea reachable only by ferry. The idea may
be to carve out something more “logical”.

No doubt the Ukrainians also violated the ceasefire, as well as responding to
rebel moves. But an end to the fighting would have been so overwhelmingly to
Ukraine’s advantage, even if areas remained under rebel control, that it is simply not
believable that they were the main instigators. The plain truth is that Russia will not
let Ukraine go. It is waging a hybrid war, part conventional but deniable (at least by
Russian standards), and one camouflaged by a huge campaign of disinformation, in
Russia itself, in Ukraine, and in the rest of the world. Sanctions are the only available response. They will have to be maintained and very possibly increased, and the same goes for economic aid to Ukraine.

The Russians might withdraw the forces they have sent in. They have done that before, but unfortunately this has never been the end of the story. Indeed, that story could be a long and damaging one for both sides. The latest collateral damage is to the programme to ensure the security of nuclear materials in Russia, one on which the United States and Russia have collaborated for 20 years. It was based on a common understanding that such materials were too widely dispersed and therefore vulnerable to seizure by terrorists. That remains true, but now the Russians have announced that they foresee no new joint projects in Russia. As with so many other areas in relations with Russia, the problem is not over, but the era of co-operation unfortunately is.

*The Guardian*, Saturday 15 November 2014

**Speak on the topic** What is the principal states division as to their acceptance of the international ‘status quo’?

Bapia 18.

*Read and translate the text:*

**Ten global consequences of the Ukraine crisis**

Russian actions - and Western responses to them - will not lead to the unwinding of the current international order, but they could accelerate the process. For the last few decades, Western powers have benefited from an international architecture they designed and policed. Although rising powers such as Brazil, China, and India have not overturned these post-war institutions, they are uncomfortable with the way the West has used global institutions to pursue its own interests and are increasingly “routing around” global institutions by creating bilateral arrangements while caucusing within them to hollow out the liberal bias of their rules and regulations. If the West now tries to use these institutions to act not just against Iran and North Korea but against Russia - a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council - it may find that it encourages revisionism rather than deterring it.

“The world will never be the same again”, said European Council President Herman van Rompuy after Crimea, conjuring up a geopolitical awakening at the heart of the EU. So far the crisis has been contained to Ukraine rather than spilling over across the post-Soviet space or bringing the global economy to its knees. What will the longer-term global consequences of the Ukraine crisis be? That is the question that we have tried to answer by drawing on the expertise of all ECFR’s programmes, compiling here 10 of the striking effects.

Our findings are framed by a bigger story about global order that predates the
crisis in Ukraine. Since the end of the Cold War, the world has benefited from two orders: an American-led security order that ensured a balance of power in every region, and a European-led legal order that sought to write rules for our interdependent world - in everything from free trade and climate emissions to financial transactions and genocide. The backdrop to the Ukraine crisis is the fraying of the American-led security order as non-Western powers rise and the US recalibrates its foreign policy after a decade of war. Increasingly, the West seems to be trying to compensate for its lack of willingness to use military power by “weaponising” the international legal order - that is, using financial sanctions, asset freezes, and international law to shape the choices of revisionist powers.

**Wider Europe**

**Raising the stakes in Russia.** In the future, the annexation of Crimea may look like a watershed moment for Russia itself. It has dramatically intensified the internal political and economic strains that Putin’s authoritarian regime was already facing and thus created a domestic pressure cooker, which may relatively quickly spawn either fully-fledged authoritarianism or the collapse of the regime - the exact contours of the outcome remain anyone's guess for now.

**An open challenge to the European Order.** By annexing Crimea and intervening in Ukraine, Russia has raised fundamental questions about the principles of the European order. Russia was always against the principle that countries are free to choose their alliances and has consistently, though often covertly, tried to derail NATO enlargement into its neighbourhood. But Putin is now challenging these principles explicitly. Russia wants to both restore and re-legitimise spheres of influence as an organising principle of European order. This is a direct challenge to Europe and the West as a whole: although some countries might be willing to accept implicitly Russia’s view of European order, none can afford to do so explicitly. But it seems even less likely than before that Russia will accept the Western-led order.

**International law**

**Contest for international norms.** We face a contested international normative terrain. Russia's actions under Putin represent a two-pronged attack on Western ideas of international order. First, Putin challenges the principled basis of Western policy, asserting that the US and Europe only pretend to respect international law but in fact are happy to act outside it when their interests are at stake. He cites Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya as evidence. Secondly, he presents an essentially illiberal vision of world order that he claims to be more realistic, based on spheres of influence, opposition to popular empowerment and favouring one's own national or linguistic group - in each respect a direct opposite of Western ideas of liberal order.

**The West loses the Rest.** Despite the fact that Russia’s use of force to annex
territory set a precedent that threatens widespread disorder, the world has not taken the West's side. The large number of abstentions in the UN General Assembly vote shows that many countries see this as a struggle between power blocs rather than as a fundamental question of international order and do not accept the West's self-identification as the guardian of liberal order. The “Rest” - that is, non-Western countries - have found some of the actions cited by Putin troubling and do not separate their views of Western-backed liberal order from their conviction that the West enjoys an unjustified position of privilege in the international system. We should reject any equivalence between controversial Western actions and Russian action in Ukraine, but we also need to revisit and strengthen the international foundations of the liberal vision.

_Speak on the topic What is the ‘status quo’?_

_Вариант 19._

_Read and translate the text:_

**Middle East & North Africa**

**The beginning of the end of sanctions.** The West's Middle East adversaries have been at the sharpest end of the impact of punitive US-led economic sanctions - from Libya and Iraq and more recently Iran, which continue to this day. The Ukraine crisis could mark the beginning of the denouement of economic sanctions as the preferred instrument of contemporary US coercive power. Going after Russia, the world's 9th largest economy, may represent the kind of overreach in economic coercion that the Iraq war demonstrated in the military arena. Expect some acceleration of efforts by an "alliance of the threatened" to develop circumvention options (bank and payment systems, reserve currencies) to insulate themselves from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. This will have implications for the Middle East and far beyond. And Europe too might want to question the desirability of being so exposed to the predilections of the US treasury - as the current predicament of BNP Paribas indicates.

**Looking to MENA for energy.** Any European strategy to reduce energy dependence on Russia will inevitably turn its attention to the Middle East. Alongside existing sources in Algeria and the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Ukraine crisis could make the sanctioned Iranian energy market look ever more attractive - encouraging Russia-Iranian competition as opposed to cooperation. Or Europe might refocus attention on Libya and to bringing its potential 1.6 million barrels per day back online, or see new opportunities in the Kurdish or other regions of Iraq especially given new pipeline options via Turkey. The prospects for a serious Middle East energy pivot may prove as elusive as they are tantalising, but they should
be on Europe’s radar.

**Asia & China**

**Asian countries are competing to woo Putin.** As tensions increase in Asia, many countries in the region are trying to strengthen their strategic relationships with external powers - and despite its actions in Ukraine, even Western allies in Asia have continued to woo Putin’s Russia. For example, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has opened up to Russia because he is seeking a territorial settlement over the four islands that both Tokyo and Beijing claim, and wants to keep Russia from joining China’s side. Similarly, South Korea is engaging to get Moscow’s cooperation with North Korea. By comparison, Europeans do not have in Asia the leverage that would allow them to enlist Asian countries’ full cooperation on issues such as Crimea and Ukraine.

**Asia hates western intervention even more than self-determination.** Given that many Asian countries worry about their own secessionist regions, you would think that they would oppose Russia’s annexation of Crimea. But the Ukraine crisis illustrates how they worry even more about Western intervention. Given the choice between self-determination and holding sovereignty sacred, Asia mostly chooses the latter. Even India, which should worry about any referendum on secession because of the Kashmir issue, and especially China, which sees a chance of enlisting Russia in its own territorial gambits.

**European Union**

**European unity in escalation.** In the past, relations with Russia were the most divisive issue in European foreign policy. But the EU has maintained cohesion in responding to Putin’s aggression with limited sanctions, political and economic support for the new Ukrainian leadership, and the maintenance of diplomatic channels with Russia. Poland and the Baltic states wanted a bolder response but compromised in the name of European unity. The recent decision of the Bulgarian government to suspend the construction of South Stream shows that the European Commission’s pressure is working. And Europe still possesses its weapon of mass destruction which gives it a leverage on Russia: access to its financial sector. The EU has to work on how to fine tune this weapon and use it as a deterrence.

**The risk of disunity with de-escalation.** However, the crisis has also showed that this unity, as much as it is valuable, has been fragile and lacking leadership. Most notably, neither the Weimar Triangle, nor the Visegrad Group - two formats which could provide stronger impulses for both crisis management and long term strategy towards EaP countries and Russia - have been efficient. Sure, many countries previously most engaged in the EU Eastern policy (Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Czech republic, Hungary) have managed to agree on relatively low-common-denominator reactions to the ongoing developments in Ukraine. But they remain
divided on the long term issues that will determine EU policy in the future: most notably a possible energy union and the lessons learned from the failure of the Vilnius summit. Competing readings of the mistakes made by the EU in its policy towards Eastern partners (“bad communication of this policy to Russia” versus “insufficient offer to Ukraine”) may make the current consensus difficult to sustain.


Speak on the topic What is the essence of Dependency theory?

Вариант 20.

Read and translate the text:

Putin’s D-Day date with the West

A lull in tensions in eastern Ukraine is deceptive. Exchanges of gunfire, artillery barrages and even air strikes punctuate daily life in parts of eastern Ukraine as the nation’s armed forces battle a pro-Russian, separatist insurrection. According to the government in Kiev, 181 people, including 59 servicemen, have been killed since unrest broke out in April; 293 have been wounded and 220 kidnapped. The rising casualty toll, the uninterrupted violence and Russia’s refusal to rein in the insurgents, or to acknowledge its role in stirring them up, should dispel any complacency in western capitals that Ukraine’s successfully held May 25 presidential election has eased the crisis.

True, the worst-case scenario of a Russian invasion and full-scale civil war has not materialised. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, has pulled back some of the tens of thousands of troops massed on Ukraine’s borders. The Kremlin has indicated it will respect Petro Poroshenko’s election as Ukraine’s president. In talks brokered by the EU, Russia is contemplating a temporary solution to the perennial problem of Ukraine’s multibillion-dollar gas debts to Moscow.

All of this is useful, but it does not go anywhere like far enough - as Barack Obama, François Hollande and David Cameron, the US, French and British leaders, should make plain to Mr Putin when their paths cross in Paris on Thursday and in Normandy on Friday, on the 70th anniversary of the D-Day landings. These will be the first face-to-face meetings between western leaders and Mr Putin since his cold-blooded annexation in March of Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula. Mr Obama and his European allies must spell out to Mr Putin that, far from being grateful that Russia has not amputated eastern Ukraine in a Crimea-style operation, they will judge him by the practical actions required to defuse a crisis for which he was largely responsible in the first place.

If he were sincere about calming tensions, the obvious steps would be to halt the
flow of fighters and weapons into Ukraine from Russia and to dismantle the still excessive Russian military presence on Ukraine’s frontiers. Mr Putin would then authorise Russian officials to engage in constructive discussions with their US, European and Ukrainian counterparts over how to maintain the peace in eastern Ukraine. Finally, he would lend support to the Ukrainian government’s proposals to grant more autonomy to the nation’s regions, especially the Russophone east, in a way that does not paralyse the central authorities in Kiev. This would be in keeping with the wishes of a majority of citizens in eastern Ukraine, who favour not annexation to Russia but enhanced self-government and protection of their cultural and linguistic rights.

Washington and its allies are signalling that this week is not the time to extend the limited sanctions imposed on Russia after the annexation of Crimea. This is the correct call. If the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine intensifies, tougher sanctions will be necessary. In present circumstances, however, the west ought to turn its attention to two other tasks. One is to promote the reform effort in Ukraine, starting with a clean-up of the Augean stables of corruption in state administration, business and politics. The second is to reassure those NATO members that share borders with Russia of the alliance’s full commitment to its founding principle of collective defence.

Two months into the insurrection, it is increasingly clear that separatism in eastern Ukraine is not carrying all before it. Even in Crimea, the tide of events may one day turn - as is suggested by the way Russia has been unable to control recent popular unrest in Abkhazia, the breakaway Georgian region it has funded since 2008. Patience, backed by vigilance, will be the most effective instrument in the west’s dealings with Moscow.

Speak on the topic What is the current international system consistent with?

Вариант 21.

Read and translate the text:

Financial Times

Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault the Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin

By John J. Mearsheimer

According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a long-standing desire to resuscitate the Soviet empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other countries
in eastern Europe. In this view, the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 merely provided a pretext for Putin’s decision to order Russian forces to seize part of Ukraine.

But this account is wrong: the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the EU’s expansion eastward and the West’s backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine -- beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004 -- were critical elements, too. Since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement, and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western bastion. For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president -- which he rightly labeled a “coup” -- was the final straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a NATO naval base, and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West.

Putin’s pushback should have come as no surprise. After all, the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly. Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events only because they subscribe to a flawed view of international politics. They tend to believe that the logic of realism holds little relevance in the twenty-first century and that Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of law, economic interdependence, and democracy.

But this grand scheme went awry in Ukraine. The crisis there shows that realpolitik remains relevant -- and states that ignore it do so at their own peril. U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border. Now that the consequences have been laid bare, it would be an even greater mistake to continue this misbegotten policy.

U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border.

*Speak on the topic* Is ‘unipolarity’ a stable configuration?

Вариант 22.

*Read and translate the text:*

**THE WESTERN AFFRON'T**

As the Cold War came to a close, Soviet leaders preferred that U.S. forces remain in Europe and NATO stay intact, an arrangement they thought would keep a
reunified Germany pacified. But they and their Russian successors did not want NATO to grow any larger and assumed that Western diplomats understood their concerns. The Clinton administration evidently thought otherwise, and in the mid-1990s, it began pushing for NATO to expand.

The first round of enlargement took place in 1999 and brought in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The second occurred in 2004; it included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Moscow complained bitterly from the start. During NATO’s 1995 bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, for example, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said, “This is the first sign of what could happen when NATO comes right up to the Russian Federation’s borders. ... The flame of war could burst out across the whole of Europe.” But the Russians were too weak at the time to derail NATO’s eastward movement -- which, at any rate, did not look so threatening, since none of the new members shared a border with Russia, save for the tiny Baltic countries.

Then NATO began looking further east. At its April 2008 summit in Bucharest, the alliance considered admitting Georgia and Ukraine. The George W. Bush administration supported doing so, but France and Germany opposed the move for fear that it would unduly antagonize Russia. In the end, NATO’s members reached a compromise: the alliance did not begin the formal process leading to membership, but it issued a statement endorsing the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine and boldly declaring, “These countries will become members of NATO.”

Moscow, however, did not see the outcome as much of a compromise. Alexander Grushko, then Russia’s deputy foreign minister, said, “Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which would have most serious consequences for pan-European security.” Putin maintained that admitting those two countries to NATO would represent a “direct threat” to Russia. One Russian newspaper reported that Putin, while speaking with Bush, “very transparently hinted that if Ukraine was accepted into NATO, it would cease to exist.”

Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008 should have dispelled any remaining doubts about Putin’s determination to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from joining NATO. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who was deeply committed to bringing his country into NATO, had decided in the summer of 2008 to reincorporate two separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But Putin sought to keep Georgia weak and divided -- and out of NATO. After fighting broke out between the Georgian government and South Ossetian separatists, Russian forces took control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow had made its point. Yet despite this clear warning, NATO never publicly abandoned its goal of bringing Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance. And NATO expansion continued marching forward, with
Albania and Croatia becoming members in 2009.

The EU, too, has been marching eastward. In May 2008, it unveiled its Eastern Partnership initiative, a program to foster prosperity in such countries as Ukraine and integrate them into the EU economy. Not surprisingly, Russian leaders view the plan as hostile to their country’s interests. This past February, before Yanukovych was forced from office, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the EU of trying to create a “sphere of influence” in eastern Europe. In the eyes of Russian leaders, EU expansion is a stalking horse for NATO expansion.

The West’s final tool for peeling Kiev away from Moscow has been its efforts to spread Western values and promote democracy in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, a plan that often entails funding pro-Western individuals and organizations. Victoria Nuland, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, estimated in December 2013 that the United States had invested more than $5 billion since 1991 to help Ukraine achieve “the future it deserves.” As part of that effort, the U.S. government has bankrolled the National Endowment for Democracy. The nonprofit foundation has funded more than 60 projects aimed at promoting civil society in Ukraine, and the NED’s president, Carl Gershman, has called that country “the biggest prize.” After Yanukovych won Ukraine’s presidential election in February 2010, the NED decided he was undermining its goals, and so it stepped up its efforts to support the opposition and strengthen the country’s democratic institutions.

When Russian leaders look at Western social engineering in Ukraine, they worry that their country might be next. And such fears are hardly groundless. In September 2013, Gershman wrote in The Washington Post, “Ukraine’s choice to join Europe will accelerate the demise of the ideology of Russian imperialism that Putin represents.” He added: “Russians, too, face a choice, and Putin may find himself on the losing end not just in the near abroad but within Russia itself.”

Speak on the topic What does the concept of ‘hegemony’ suggest?

Bapiaar 23.

Read and translate the text:

CREATING A CRISIS

Imagine the American outrage if China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico.

The West’s triple package of policies -- NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and democracy promotion – added fuel to a fire waiting to ignite. The spark came in November 2013, when Yanukovych rejected a major economic deal he had been negotiating with the EU and decided to accept a $15 billion Russian counteroffer
instead. That decision gave rise to antigovernment demonstrations that escalated over the following three months and that by mid-February had led to the deaths of some one hundred protesters. Western emissaries hurriedly flew to Kiev to resolve the crisis. On February 21, the government and the opposition struck a deal that allowed Yanukovych to stay in power until new elections were held. But it immediately fell apart, and Yanukovych fled to Russia the next day. The new government in Kiev was pro-Western and anti-Russian to the core, and it contained four high-ranking members who could legitimately be labeled neofascists.

Although the full extent of U.S. involvement has not yet come to light, it is clear that Washington backed the coup. Nuland and Republican Senator John McCain participated in antigovernment demonstrations, and Geoffrey Pyatt, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, proclaimed after Yanukovych’s toppling that it was “a day for the history books.” As a leaked telephone recording revealed, Nuland had advocated regime change and wanted the Ukrainian politician Arseniy Yatsenyuk to become prime minister in the new government, which he did. No wonder Russians of all persuasions think the West played a role in Yanukovych’s ouster.

For Putin, the time to act against Ukraine and the West had arrived. Shortly after February 22, he ordered Russian forces to take Crimea from Ukraine, and soon after that, he incorporated it into Russia. The task proved relatively easy, thanks to the thousands of Russian troops already stationed at a naval base in the Crimean port of Sevastopol. Crimea also made for an easy target since ethnic Russians compose roughly 60 percent of its population. Most of them wanted out of Ukraine.

Next, Putin put massive pressure on the new government in Kiev to discourage it from siding with the West against Moscow, making it clear that he would wreck Ukraine as a functioning state before he would allow it to become a Western stronghold on Russia’s doorstep. Toward that end, he has provided advisers, arms, and diplomatic support to the Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, who are pushing the country toward civil war. He has massed a large army on the Ukrainian border, threatening to invade if the government cracks down on the rebels. And he has sharply raised the price of the natural gas Russia sells to Ukraine and demanded payment for past exports. Putin is playing hardball.

*Speak on the topic When did the theory of ‘the balance of power’ gain prominence?*

Вариант 24.

*Read and translate the text:*

**THE DIAGNOSIS**

Putin’s actions should be easy to comprehend. A huge expanse of flat land that
Napoleonic France, imperial Germany, and Nazi Germany all crossed to strike at Russia itself, Ukraine serves as a buffer state of enormous strategic importance to Russia. No Russian leader would tolerate a military alliance that was Moscow’s mortal enemy until recently moving into Ukraine. Nor would any Russian leader stand idly by while the West helped install a government there that was determined to integrate Ukraine into the West.

Washington may not like Moscow’s position, but it should understand the logic behind it. This is Geopolitics 101: great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory. After all, the United States does not tolerate distant great powers deploying military forces anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, much less on its borders. Imagine the outrage in Washington if China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico in it. Logic aside, Russian leaders have told their Western counterparts on many occasions that they consider NATO expansion into Georgia and Ukraine unacceptable, along with any effort to turn those countries against Russia -- a message that the 2008 Russian-Georgian war also made crystal clear.

Officials from the United States and its European allies contend that they tried hard to assuage Russian fears and that Moscow should understand that NATO has no designs on Russia. In addition to continually denying that its expansion was aimed at containing Russia, the alliance has never permanently deployed military forces in its new member states. In 2002, it even created a body called the NATO-Russia Council in an effort to foster cooperation. To further mollify Russia, the United States announced in 2009 that it would deploy its new missile defense system on warships in European waters, at least initially, rather than on Czech or Polish territory. But none of these measures worked; the Russians remained steadfastly opposed to NATO enlargement, especially into Georgia and Ukraine. And it is the Russians, not the West, who ultimately get to decide what counts as a threat to them.

To understand why the West, especially the United States, failed to understand that its Ukraine policy was laying the groundwork for a major clash with Russia, one must go back to the mid-1990s, when the Clinton administration began advocating NATO expansion. Pundits advanced a variety of arguments for and against enlargement, but there was no consensus on what to do. Most eastern European émigrés in the United States and their relatives, for example, strongly supported expansion, because they wanted NATO to protect such countries as Hungary and Poland. A few realists also favored the policy because they thought Russia still needed to be contained.

But most realists opposed expansion, in the belief that a declining great power with an aging population and a one-dimensional economy did not in fact need to be contained. And they feared that enlargement would only give Moscow an incentive to
cause trouble in eastern Europe. The U.S. diplomat George Kennan articulated this perspective in a 1998 interview, shortly after the U.S. Senate approved the first round of NATO expansion. “I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies,” he said. “I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anyone else.”

The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral buffer.

Most liberals, on the other hand, favored enlargement, including many key members of the Clinton administration. They believed that the end of the Cold War had fundamentally transformed international politics and that a new, postnational order had replaced the realist logic that used to govern Europe. The United States was not only the “indispensable nation,” as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put it; it was also a benign hegemon and thus unlikely to be viewed as a threat in Moscow. The aim, in essence, was to make the entire continent look like western Europe.

And so the United States and its allies sought to promote democracy in the countries of eastern Europe, increase economic interdependence among them, and embed them in international institutions. Having won the debate in the United States, liberals had little difficulty convincing their European allies to support NATO enlargement. After all, given the EU’s past achievements, Europeans were even more wedded than Americans to the idea that geopolitics no longer mattered and that an allinclusive liberal order could maintain peace in Europe.

So thoroughly did liberals come to dominate the discourse about European security during the first decade of this century that even as the alliance adopted an open-door policy of growth, NATO expansion faced little realist opposition. The liberal worldview is now accepted dogma among U.S. officials. In March, for example, President Barack Obama delivered a speech about Ukraine in which he talked repeatedly about “the ideals” that motivate Western policy and how those ideals “have often been threatened by an older, more traditional view of power.” Secretary of State John Kerry’s response to the Crimea crisis reflected this same perspective: “You just don’t in the twenty-first century behave in nineteenth-century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped-up pretext.”

In essence, the two sides have been operating with different playbooks: Putin and his compatriots have been thinking and acting according to realist dictates, whereas their Western counterparts have been adhering to liberal ideas about international politics. The result is that the United States and its allies unknowingly provoked a major crisis over Ukraine.

Speak on the topic When did ‘unipolarity’ arise?
Read and translate the text:

**BLAME GAME**

In that same 1998 interview, Kennan predicted that NATO expansion would provoke a crisis, after which the proponents of expansion would “say that we always told you that is how the Russians are.” As if on cue, most Western officials have portrayed Putin as the real culprit in the Ukraine predicament. In March, according to *The New York Times*, German Chancellor Angela Merkel implied that Putin was irrational, telling Obama that he was “in another world.” Although Putin no doubt has autocratic tendencies, no evidence supports the charge that he is mentally unbalanced. On the contrary: he is a first-class strategist who should be feared and respected by anyone challenging him on foreign policy.

Other analysts allege, more plausibly, that Putin regrets the demise of the Soviet Union and is determined to reverse it by expanding Russia’s borders. According to this interpretation, Putin, having taken Crimea, is now testing the waters to see if the time is right to conquer Ukraine, or at least its eastern part, and he will eventually behave aggressively toward other countries in Russia’s neighborhood. For some in this camp, Putin represents a modern-day Adolf Hitler, and striking any kind of deal with him would repeat the mistake of Munich. Thus, NATO must admit Georgia and Ukraine to contain Russia before it dominates its neighbors and threatens western Europe.

This argument falls apart on close inspection. If Putin were committed to creating a greater Russia, signs of his intentions would almost certainly have arisen before February 22. But there is virtually no evidence that he was bent on taking Crimea, much less any other territory in Ukraine, before that date. Even Western leaders who supported NATO expansion were not doing so out of a fear that Russia was about to use military force. Putin’s actions in Crimea took them by complete surprise and appear to have been a spontaneous reaction to Yanukovych’s ouster. Right afterward, even Putin said he opposed Crimean secession, before quickly changing his mind.

Besides, even if it wanted to, Russia lacks the capability to easily conquer and annex eastern Ukraine, much less the entire country. Roughly 15 million people -- one-third of Ukraine’s population -- live between the Dnieper River, which bisects the country, and the Russian border. An overwhelming majority of those people want to remain part of Ukraine and would surely resist a Russian occupation. Furthermore, Russia’s mediocre army, which shows few signs of turning into a modern Wehrmacht, would have little chance of pacifying all of Ukraine. Moscow is also poorly positioned to pay for a costly occupation; its weak economy would suffer even more in the face of the resulting sanctions.
But even if Russia did boast a powerful military machine and an impressive economy, it would still probably prove unable to successfully occupy Ukraine. One need only consider the Soviet and U.S. experiences in Afghanistan, the U.S. experiences in Vietnam and Iraq, and the Russian experience in Chechnya to be reminded that military occupations usually end badly. Putin surely understands that trying to subdue Ukraine would be like swallowing a porcupine. His response to events there has been defensive, not offensive.

Speak on the topic *How can the international system prior to 1945 be described?*

Вариант 26.

*Read and translate the text:*

**A WAY OUT**

Given that most Western leaders continue to deny that Putin’s behavior might be motivated by legitimate security concerns, it is unsurprising that they have tried to modify it by doubling down on their existing policies and have punished Russia to deter further aggression. Although Kerry has maintained that “all options are on the table,” neither the United States nor its NATO allies are prepared to use force to defend Ukraine. The West is relying instead on economic sanctions to coerce Russia into ending its support for the insurrection in eastern Ukraine. In July, the United States and the EU put in place their third round of limited sanctions, targeting mainly high-level individuals closely tied to the Russian government and some high-profile banks, energy companies, and defense firms. They also threatened to unleash another, tougher round of sanctions, aimed at whole sectors of the Russian economy.

Such measures will have little effect. Harsh sanctions are likely off the table anyway; western European countries, especially Germany, have resisted imposing them for fear that Russia might retaliate and cause serious economic damage within the EU. But even if the United States could convince its allies to enact tough measures, Putin would probably not alter his decision-making. History shows that countries will absorb enormous amounts of punishment in order to protect their core strategic interests. There is no reason to think Russia represents an exception to this rule.

Western leaders have also clung to the provocative policies that precipitated the crisis in the first place. In April, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden met with Ukrainian legislators and told them, “This is a second opportunity to make good on the original promise made by the Orange Revolution.” John Brennan, the director of the CIA, did not help things when, that same month, he visited Kiev on a trip the White House said was aimed at improving security cooperation with the Ukrainian
The EU, meanwhile, has continued to push its Eastern Partnership. In March, José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission, summarized EU thinking on Ukraine, saying, “We have a debt, a duty of solidarity with that country, and we will work to have them as close as possible to us.” And sure enough, on June 27, the EU and Ukraine signed the economic agreement that Yanukovych had fatefuly rejected seven months earlier. Also in June, at a meeting of NATO members’ foreign ministers, it was agreed that the alliance would remain open to new members, although the foreign ministers refrained from mentioning Ukraine by name. “No third country has a veto over NATO enlargement,” announced Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s secretary-general. The foreign ministers also agreed to support various measures to improve Ukraine’s military capabilities in such areas as command and control, logistics, and cyberdefense. Russian leaders have naturally recoiled at these actions; the West’s response to the crisis will only make a bad situation worse.

There is a solution to the crisis in Ukraine, however -- although it would require the West to think about the country in a fundamentally new way. The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral buffer between NATO and Russia, akin to Austria’s position during the Cold War. Western leaders should acknowledge that Ukraine matters so much to Putin that they cannot support an anti-Russian regime there. This would not mean that a future Ukrainian government would have to be pro-Russian or anti-NATO. On the contrary, the goal should be a sovereign Ukraine that falls in neither the Russian nor the Western camp.

To achieve this end, the United States and its allies should publicly rule out NATO’s expansion into both Georgia and Ukraine. The West should also help fashion an economic rescue plan for Ukraine funded jointly by the EU, the International Monetary Fund, Russia, and the United States -- a proposal that Moscow should welcome, given its interest in having a prosperous and stable Ukraine on its western flank. And the West should considerably limit its social-engineering efforts inside Ukraine. It is time to put an end to Western support for another Orange Revolution. Nevertheless, U.S. and European leaders should encourage Ukraine to respect minority rights, especially the language rights of its Russian speakers.

_Speak on the topic_ **What did the concept of ‘polarity’ arise from?**

Варіант 27.

_Read and translate the text:_

**A WAY OUT (2)**
Some may argue that changing policy toward Ukraine at this late date would seriously damage U.S. credibility around the world. There would undoubtedly be certain costs, but the costs of continuing a misguided strategy would be much greater. Furthermore, other countries are likely to respect a state that learns from its mistakes and ultimately devises a policy that deals effectively with the problem at hand. That option is clearly open to the United States.

One also hears the claim that Ukraine has the right to determine whom it wants to ally with and the Russians have no right to prevent Kiev from joining the West. This is a dangerous way for Ukraine to think about its foreign policy choices. The sad truth is that might often makes right when great-power politics are at play. Abstract rights such as self-determination are largely meaningless when powerful states get into brawls with weaker states. Did Cuba have the right to form a military alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War? The United States certainly did not think so, and the Russians think the same way about Ukraine joining the West. It is in Ukraine’s interest to understand these facts of life and tread carefully when dealing with its more powerful neighbor.

Even if one rejects this analysis, however, and believes that Ukraine has the right to petition to join the EU and NATO, the fact remains that the United States and its European allies have the right to reject these requests. There is no reason that the West has to accommodate Ukraine if it is bent on pursuing a wrong-headed foreign policy, especially if its defense is not a vital interest. Indulging the dreams of some Ukrainians is not worth the animosity and strife it will cause, especially for the Ukrainian people.

Of course, some analysts might concede that NATO handled relations with Ukraine poorly and yet still maintain that Russia constitutes an enemy that will only grow more formidable over time -- and that the West therefore has no choice but to continue its present policy. But this viewpoint is badly mistaken. Russia is a declining power, and it will only get weaker with time. Even if Russia were a rising power, moreover, it would still make no sense to incorporate Ukraine into NATO. The reason is simple: the United States and its European allies do not consider Ukraine to be a core strategic interest, as their unwillingness to use military force to come to its aid has proved. It would therefore be the height of folly to create a new NATO member that the other members have no intention of defending. NATO has expanded in the past because liberals assumed the alliance would never have to honor its new security guarantees, but Russia’s recent power play shows that granting Ukraine NATO membership could put Russia and the West on a collision course.

Sticking with the current policy would also complicate Western relations with Moscow on other issues. The United States needs Russia’s assistance to withdraw U.S. equipment from Afghanistan through Russian territory, reach a nuclear
agreement with Iran, and stabilize the situation in Syria. In fact, Moscow has helped Washington on all three of these issues in the past; in the summer of 2013, it was Putin who pulled Obama’s chestnuts out of the fire by forging the deal under which Syria agreed to relinquish its chemical weapons, thereby avoiding the U.S. military strike that Obama had threatened. The United States will also someday need Russia’s help containing a rising China. Current U.S. policy, however, is only driving Moscow and Beijing closer together.

The United States and its European allies now face a choice on Ukraine. They can continue their current policy, which will exacerbate hostilities with Russia and devastate Ukraine in the process -- a scenario in which everyone would come out a loser. Or they can switch gears and work to create a prosperous but neutral Ukraine, one that does not threaten Russia and allows the West to repair its relations with Moscow. With that approach, all sides would win.

*Speak on the topic What does the concept of ‘polarity’ refer to?*

Вариант 28.

*Read and translate the text:*

**After 9/11, Some Things Never Changed**

**By Scott Stewart**

As I’ve noted elsewhere, as a member of the team that investigated the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, I was profoundly and personally affected when I watched the buildings collapse on live television on Sept. 11, 2001, and by the attack on the Pentagon and the fate of United Flight 93. And I was not alone; Americans from all walks of life and across all political persuasions were deeply affected by the spectacular attacks. They also made a profound impression on people outside of the United States. The front page of the French newspaper Le Monde declared on Sept. 12, 2001, "We are all Americans" — a sentiment shared by a large number of foreign citizens and leaders.

In countless television interviews, people affected by the 9/11 attacks looked sincerely into the camera and told the world, "Things will never be the same again." And for a while, things did change. In the wake of the attack, police officers and firefighters again became heroes. New York Police Department and New York Fire Department hats and t-shirts became best sellers worn by the public in cities and states across the country. In the face of a nebulous and sinister external threat — Americans were waiting for the promised, spectacular follow-on attack to 9/11 — patriotism soared and Americans became united. They were united not only in their fear but also by their thirst for revenge and their support for the U.S. government and military.
Increased patriotism and support for law enforcement and the military in turn undermined domestic political extremism across the spectrum. The radical anarchist movement had grown alarmingly through the 1990s, as reflected by the November 1999 "battle of Seattle," in which anarchists protesting a meeting of the World Trade Organization fought police and caused significant damage to corporate targets in downtown Seattle. But the 9/11 attacks took much of the air out of the anti-government, anti-capitalist movement. In January 2002, the World Economic Forum meeting was moved from Davos, Switzerland, to New York, in a move intended to show solidarity with the city and the United States. The meeting was remarkable for the low level of protester activity and violence. In contrast, the 2000 and 2001 World Economic Forums in Davos — where I worked on a protective security detail — had been marred by violent protests.

The far-left radicals were not the only ones affected by 9/11. Like the far left, the radical right had also picked up momentum in the late 1990s. After a rash of white supremacist attacks in summer 1999 that included shooting sprees, murders and synagogue arsons, many labeled it the "Summer of Hate." But following 9/11, the anti-government militia movement and the white supremacist movement lost steam. Participants on white supremacist message boards began to rail against "patriotards" (patriotic white Americans) for their support of the government and theories began to abound in militia circles about how the 9/11 attacks were conducted by the U.S. government as an excuse to clamp down on domestic extremists and eventually impose martial law.

In the 14 years since the 9/11 attacks, the United States found itself locked in a protracted war against jihadism. While there have been some successes in this war, like the death of Osama bin Laden and the destruction of most of the original al Qaeda core leadership, those successes came at a very high price. The invasion and lengthy occupations of both Afghanistan and Iraq have cost the lives of thousands of American servicemen, tens of thousands of civilians and billions of dollars. Yet despite these sacrifices, al Qaeda franchise groups remain a potent force in several parts of the world, and a virulent new strain of jihadism has mutated from al Qaeda to become the Islamic State.

Speak on the topic What does ‘soft power’ mean?

Вариант 29.

Read and translate the text:
Cyber Espionage to Splinter Internet Governance

Ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Washington at the end of September, the White House reportedly is ready to announce sanctions against Chinese entities allegedly involved in industrial espionage. The specific targets of the sanctions have not been revealed, but the sanctions will likely focus on the use of cyberattacks to siphon intellectual property and trade secrets. The planned sanctions follow U.S. President Barack Obama's executive order authorizing the Treasury Department to seize the assets of and bar financial transactions with entities engaged in cyberattacks.

The timing of the announcement, so close to Xi's visit to the United States, will likely anger Xi's constituents, who will see it as an attack on China's image during a presidential tour. Thus, the White House's sanctions serve as a gesture to China but also to Obama's domestic audience, which has grown more concerned about Chinese espionage in light of high-profile cyberattacks against U.S. businesses and government interests.

The message is Washington's latest attempt to use its foreign policy to deter cyberattacks, in the hopes that nominal sanctions and criminal indictments will force China to a diplomatic solution regarding cyber espionage. However, any sanctions against Chinese businesses or individuals are unlikely to dissuade China's global cyber espionage activities.

The United States' uphill battle in protecting its interests in cyberspace is similar to the struggle for many countries around the world whose economic interests are increasingly intertwined with the Internet. While the United States continues to leverage foreign policy as a defense, other countries are turning to domestic policies that regulate Internet activity for both end users and businesses.

The global economy's increasing reliance on Internet technologies and widening competition in high-tech industries around the world will further promote global industrial espionage. Cyber espionage and data breaches for technology-based companies will heighten the sense of urgency for national governments seeking to stymie the threat. The collective efforts of countries attempting to safeguard against foreign cyberattacks, like those motivated by industrial espionage, will continue to divide the Internet into fragmented regulatory environments.

Industrial Espionage Meets Cyberspace

Industrial espionage, whether against the United States or any other country, is a highly diffused threat that can and does emerge from virtually any country. China's espionage activities are particularly prolific, but even U.S. allies such as France, Japan or Israel have at some point acted against U.S. economic interests by collecting information in secret. Likewise, the United States has used cyber espionage to target its allies with industrial espionage and broader spying activities.
Industrial espionage threats can also emerge from both state and non-state actors, such as businesses, lone actors or professional cyber criminals, largely motivated by their home country's economic conditions and the value any trade secret possessed by a foreign (or domestic) company could hold. For example, in China, where the government wants innovation for the high-tech sector and the domestic demand for online services and high-tech devices is high, an individual could have substantial monetary incentive for spying on foreign technology companies.

In 2013, network security researchers identified someone believed to be a non-state actor based in India who had been carrying out a cyber espionage campaign targeting both government and private sector interests in several regions, including South and East Asia, Europe and North America. In the United States, the attackers targeted the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, though the objective of that specific attack is unknown. If the attacker was not tied to a government intelligence service, the widespread activities would suggest the attacker was a cyber criminal.

_Speak on the topic What does ‘hard power’ mean?_

**Вариант 30.**

_Read and translate the text:_

**Europe Rethinks the Schengen Agreement**

When France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the Schengen Agreement in 1985, they envisioned a system in which people and goods could move from one country to another without barriers. This vision was largely realized: since its implementation in 1995, the Schengen Agreement eliminated border controls between its signatories and created a common visa policy for 26 countries.

The treaty was a key step in the creation of a federal Europe. By eliminating border controls, member states gave up a basic element of national sovereignty. The agreement also required a significant degree of trust among its signatories, because it put the responsibility for checking foreigners' identities and baggage on the country of first entry into the Schengen area. Once people have entered a Schengen country, they can move freely across most of Europe without facing any additional controls.

The Schengen Agreement was implemented in the 1990s, when the end of the Cold War and the prospect of permanent economic prosperity led EU members to give up national sovereignty in many sensitive areas. The creation of the eurozone is probably the most representative agreement of the period. But several things have changed in Europe since then, and member states are beginning to question many of the decisions that were made during the preceding years of optimism.
The most important change of the past six years is probably Europe's economic crisis and its byproduct, the rise of nationalist political parties. Not far behind, though, is the substantial increase in the number of asylum seekers in Europe, which is putting countries on the European Union's external borders (such as Greece and Italy) and countries in the Continent's economic core (such as France and Germany) under significant stress. This is not the first time the Schengen Agreement has been questioned, but the combination of a rising number of asylum seekers, stronger nationalist parties and fragile economic recovery are leading governments and political groups across Europe to request the redesign, and in some cases the abolishment, of the Schengen Agreement.

On the one hand, countries in northern Europe criticize countries on the Mediterranean for their lack of effective border controls and for their failure to fingerprint many of the asylum seekers that reach EU shores. This means that the migrants can move elsewhere in the Continent to apply for asylum. In recent months, French and Austrian authorities accused Rome of allowing (and even encouraging) asylum seekers to leave Italy and threatened to close their borders with Italy; indeed, France followed through with its threat and briefly closed its border in late June.

On the other hand, countries in southern Europe criticize their northern peers for their lack of solidarity. Italy and Greece have repeatedly demanded more resources to patrol the Mediterranean and rescue immigrants, more funds to shelter asylum seekers and the introduction of immigration quotas in the European Union. Central and Eastern European countries, which think asylum seekers should be distributed on a voluntary basis, rejected the idea of quotas.

The migration crisis has also led to greater friction between Schengen members and their non-Schengen neighbors. The recent dispute between France and the United Kingdom (which is not a member of the Schengen zone) over immigrants trying to cross the English Channel at the French port of Calais was perhaps the most visible example of the growing tension, but the situation also led Hungary to build a fence at its border with Serbia and issue threats to militarize the border.

**Rising Migration and Schengen's Shortcomings**

The European Union is dealing with two overlapping problems. The first is its struggle to come up with a new immigration policy. Between September and December, EU members will hold a number of meetings and summits to reform the bloc's immigration rules. Germany, a country that only a few months ago was reluctant to change the Dublin regulations (according to which asylum requests should be processed in the country of a migrant's first entry) is now leading the push for a change. Germany expects to receive some 800,000 asylum seekers this year; meanwhile, attacks against immigrant shelters in Germany are spiking.
Berlin's proposals include the creation of a common list of countries considered safe, which means their nationals, in principle, should not be allowed to request asylum in the European Union. This list would largely include countries in the Western Balkans, such as Albania and Macedonia, which are not experiencing a civil war or any particularly serious humanitarian crisis that would justify a request for asylum. Germany's second proposal is the allocation of more funds and staff to centers in Greece and Italy to identify immigrants and process their applications. Finally, Berlin will also push for a proportional distribution of migrants across the European Union.

Each of these points is highly contentious. Asylum requests are a case-by-case issue, and it often takes a long time for authorities to determine who is truly seeking asylum and who is an economic migrant. Deportation will also remain problematic, since most countries in Mediterranean Europe lack the financial and human resources to expel illegal immigrants. In addition, Mediterranean countries are unlikely to simply accept the construction of larger immigration centers within their territory without a clear system to redistribute immigrants across the Continent. Several Central and Eastern European nations opposed a recent plan by the European Commission to introduce mandatory quotas of immigrants, and that opposition is not likely to end.

The European Union's second problem is what exactly to do with the Schengen Agreement. The treaty makes it possible for illegal immigrants to move freely among member states and raises some security questions. Several member states have expressed concern that some of the thousands of migrants arriving in Europe could be terrorists. Recent episodes, such as the attempted attack on a French train in which the attacker obtained weapons in Belgium before trying to kill people on a train going from the Netherlands to France, illustrates the problems linked to the lack of border controls. Although authorities do not have the resources to place every single potential terrorist under surveillance, the lack of border controls eliminates a layer of potential threat detection.

The rise of nationalist parties is also a threat to the Schengen Agreement. In Finland, a nationalist party is already a member of the government coalition, and Euroskeptic and anti-immigration parties are influential in countries such as Denmark, Sweden and Hungary. In France, most opinion polls show that the Euroskeptic National Front will make it to the second round of the presidential election in 2017. All of these parties believe that national immigration laws should be toughened and the Schengen Agreement should be revised, if not abolished.

*Speak on the topic How can the concept of ‘power’ in international relations be described?*
Topics for Discussion

1. How can the concept of ‘power’ in international relations be described?
2. What does ‘hard power’ mean?
3. What does ‘soft power’ mean?
4. What does the concept of ‘polarity’ refer to?
5. What did the concept of ‘polarity’ arise from?
6. How can the international system prior to 1945 be described?
7. When did ‘unipolarity’ arise?
8. When did the theory of ‘the balance of power’ gain prominence?
9. What does the concept of ‘hegemony’ suggest?
10. Is ‘unipolarity’ a stable configuration?
11. What is the current international system consistent with?
12. What is the essence of Dependency theory?
13. What is the ‘status quo’?
14. What is the principal states division as to their acceptance of the international ‘status quo’?
15. Give the definition of the foreign policy of Ukraine and its principal constituents.
16. What are the main prerogatives of the Ukrainian foreign policy at present? Will you compare them to those of two decades ago?
17. What kind of relations with the neighbouring countries is Ukraine involved into? What should be done to improve the situation?
18. What International organizations is Ukraine member of? What sort of support and benefits does our state get from them? Are they of great use?
19. What are the main objectives of OSCE mission in Ukraine?
20. What are the basic scenarios of conflict settlement in the eastern regions of Ukraine? Give your reasons (pros and cons) for “peaceful” and “military” solution.
21. What is the administrative status of the Crimean Autonomous Republic currently? How is it recognized on the international arena?
22. Ukraine has had tight ties with the Russian Federation in the industrial sector for a long time. At present this collaboration has been hindered in many ways. What are Ukraine’s “cooperation” alternatives with other countries of the world?
23. What impact have the recent events in Ukraine had on the world order in general and power zones division in particular?
24. Compare the state regimes in Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Belarus and Poland.
25. Why did Ukraine’s foreign policy appear incoherent and unclear in the last two decades?
26. What prevented Ukraine from following the EU direction?
27. What are Ukraine’s new government’s main foreign policy priorities?
28. What is Ukraine’s official position concerning annexation of Crimea by Russia?
29. Is Ukraine welcomed as a EU member state?
30. What steps should our country take to gain eventual EU membership?
31. Is our country supported by the EU? In what way?
32. What were the decisive reasons for a popular revolt in November 2013?
33. What factors caused regime’s demise in February 2014?
34. What are positive and negative consequences of the regime’s collapse for Ukraine’s foreign policy?

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